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Warren Breckman’s Adventures of the Symbolic: Post-Marxism and Radical
Democracy is a magisterial history of the co-developed ideas of the symbolic and
theories of radical democracy and their culmination in post-War, post-Marxist
French thought. The book’s narration is marked by thoughtful philosophical
exegeses, historical and biographical insights, keen contextual reflection, and patient
accounts of how ideas mutate over time and occasionally return to their roots.
Whether measured in terms of its overarching philosophical argument – which
recasts our understanding of radical democratic theory within the longer history of
the symbolic – or in terms of its historical narration of the complex interwoven
history of the two fields, Breckman’s work is a resounding success. Not
unimportantly, Breckman has written a lucid book, a notable accomplishment
when examining two fields that revel in abstruse exposition. The book’s breadth of
coverage will make it an indispensable launching point for students of radical
democratic theory, while its critical and philosophical depth will be plumbed by
specialists for some time to come. It will, no doubt, become a touchstone for
historians, political theorists, and philosophers.
By expanding the philosophical and historical horizons of his analysis to 19th
century philosophy, Breckman revises a long-accepted claim regarding the
importance of the early 20th century’s linguistic turn in radical democratic theory.
This wider scope of inquiry prompts Breckman to prefer the term ‘‘symbolic turn’’
to characterize a range of critiques of the ‘‘noncorrespondence of words and things,
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the nontransparency of language, and the power of signs to constitute the things
they purportedly represent’’ (p. 11). Breckman’s arguments are persuasive. At the
core of his thesis are two interwoven claims. The first regards the pre-Marxist
foundations of symbolic theory, its occlusion by Marxist materialism, and its
incremental re-emergence as dogmatic Marxism was first philosophically under-
mined, then historically and politically delegitimized in French intellectual culture
post-Stalin. This brings Breckman to his second claim, which posits that the ‘‘return
to the political’’ occurred alongside the re-emergence of the theories of the
symbolic. Hence, while the perspective of the linguistic turn sees radical politics as
part of the shift away from Marxism, Breckman shows that the wellspring of these
political philosophies were, in fact, pre-Marxist.
The first chapter surveys the history of symbolic theory up to Marx. It begins with an
account of classicism, romanticism, and Hegel, but focuses primarily on the Left
Hegelian critique of the Romantic interpretation of the symbolic in Bruno Bauer and
Ludwig Feuerbach. The narrative is compelling, and the specific scholarly contribu-
tions – often tucked away in footnotes – are important and interesting. The
chapter allows Breckman to establish the indeterminacy (contra philosophical
universalism) at the core of radical democratic thought did not emerge from within
the tradition of political thought, but was transposed from the philosophical-symbolic
tradition. Additionally, Breckman establishes symbiotic benefits of the particular
conjunction of these two fields. Early indication of the radical critique to come was
already signaled in the critique of religion afforded by the conjunction of these ideas.
As Breckman writes of the Left Hegelians’ critique of religion: ‘‘It is not just that they
confronted a deeply rooted system of religious heteronomy with the most radical
claims for human self-sufficiency that had yet been uttered; rather, it is the fact that they
confronted an age-old system of meaning with a philosophical guarantee of their own
historical victory’’ (p. 55). That is to say, even in these early precursors of the radical
democracy/symbolism conjunction, there appeared a realization that this particular
blend of politics and philosophy could provide a measure of enchantment through its
perpetual rejection of the universal and the staid, which Breckman calls ‘‘the possibility
of a constant activation of the quest for autonomy’’ (p. 56).
Chapter Two moves this history of the symbolic from pre-Marxist Romantic
socialism to the post-Marxist/post-War era in French radical thought. Pierre Leroux
is singled out as an important precursor to these debates, taking a strong stance
against the inevitable historical closure of the Hegelian system and the vulgar
materialism of many of the socialists. Against those claims, Leroux asserts the
necessity of the mediation of the unbridgeable gap between the visible and the
invisible by way of the symbol, a mediation that for Leroux afforded a productive
space for individual and collective freedom. Marx is given a surprisingly brief
review, and quickly gives way to accounts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Louis
Althusser, and Jean Baudrillard. Breckman does a remarkably good job in giving an
account of these three challenging philosophers exactly because he does not shy
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away from the political and philosophical tensions pulling their thought in
incongruent directions, toward both radical autonomy and totalizing domination,
anarchic symbolic revelry and oppressive regimes of symbolic stasis. Ultimately,
the chapter reads as a critical account of their philosophies, most especially the
pessimism of Althusser and Baudrillard. Here, as in the conclusion, there are points
where Breckman’s sympathies as a historian seem to fray as the political
implications of the claims become overbearingly hopeless. At many of these points,
Breckman turns to long quotations instead of interpretation or criticism, seemingly
to allow their convoluted claims to fend for themselves.
Chapter Three tracks Cornelius Castoriadis’ rejections of Althusser’s attempts at re-
grounding Marxism in search of an account of radical political action. The importance
of Castoriadis, Breckman shows, stems not from his reflections on the limitations of
Althusser, but his thoughts on the political insignificance of the post-War Marxist
philosophers in either prefiguring the revolts of 1968 or in fostering their continuation.
This is an excellent chapter, of which I cannot here give an adequate account. Breckman
weaves together the history of the social imaginary and Castoriadis’ intellectual
biography in a way that clearly enunciates the content of the ideas, their contextual
significance, and their limitations, making it essential reading for those interested in
Castoriadis. Chapter Four complements the third, bringing the period to a close with
studies of Claude Lefort, Marcel Gauchet, and François Furet, as read through the prism
of political theology. The study of Lefort is especially strong.
The final two chapters take up studies of Ernesto Laclau, Chantel Mouffe, and
Slavoj Žižek. There is much to recommend here, and the chapters profit particularly
from their historical and biographical insights, brought to bear on the general
analyses of their respective political developments and theoretical claims. These
chapters also allow Breckman to posit – without further developing – a series of
problems that will already have been tallied up by readers concerned more with
democratic theory than the genealogy of the symbolic. Radical democratic theorists
have anointed themselves both ‘‘radical’’ and ‘‘democratic,’’ but it is rarely clear why
others should follow suit. For, having prioritized ‘‘constant activation’’ and ‘‘the
quest for autonomy,’’ radical democracy also invites concerns that it is also post-
solidarity, post-collective action, institutionally naı̈ve, and seemingly post-empathy
for those whose daily grind forecloses so much of what these philosophers celebrate
as democracy. Breckman does not toil over these concerns, because that is not is
intention. But he gestures toward them. Most obviously, near the conclusion of the
final chapter, he compares the falling out of Laclau and Žižek with the schism
between Eduard Bernstein and V.I. Lenin. As Breckman notes, however, the
similarities are philosophically interesting, but politically daft in crucial ways:
If the first revisionist crisis played out on the public stage of western
European socialist politics on the eve of the First World War, this latest
revisionist controversy unfolds mainly on an esoteric theoretical theater
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constructed by Žižek himself. If it takes only the slightest historical
imagination to see the resemblance to the first revisionist crisis, it takes
only the slightest skepticism to recall Marx’s maxim that history happens
twice, first as tragedy, then as farce. (p. 218)
The point is well made, and it certainly does not apply only to Žižek. To some
extent, the great success of Breckman’s scholarship is bringing into clear resolution
the singular weakness of his subject matter; one becomes quite convinced that
theories of radical democracy are elementally tied to theories of the symbolic, but
is left wondering what any of it has to do with either kratos or the demos today.
With these expressly political theoretical concerns in mind, I turn to Thinking
Radical Democracy: The Return to Politics in Post-war France edited by Martin
Breaugh, Christopher Holman, Rachel Magnusson, Paul Mazzocchi, and Devin
Penner. This edited volume focuses on various aspects of contributions to radical
democratic theory. Where Breckman reads radical democratic theory through the
tradition of the symbolic, Breaugh et al. triangulate it against post-War liberal
democracy, deliberative democracy, and Marxism. As such, these collected essays
set off where Breckman’s book ends.
Part I turns to the roots of the radical democratic tradition, with essays on Arendt
and the council system, Merleau-Ponty and Machiavelli, and Pierre Clastres and
Hobbes. Mazzocchi’s contribution on Merleau-Ponty makes a strong case for
Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Machiavelli and Marx and, ultimately, as a critic
of the political limitations of their works. It is a challenging and fruitful piece of
scholarship. Miguel Abensour’s contribution on ‘‘The Counter-Hobbes of Pierre
Clastres’’ (translated by Breaugh and Penner) is a forthright engagement with the
generally unacknowledged fact that in dismissing liberal institutionalism, the
radical democratic tradition will ultimately have to come to terms with Hobbes and
the problem of war. The three chapters making up Part II – by Carlo Invernizzi
Accetti, Brian C.J. Singer, and David Penner – are all excellent surveys of the
thought of Lefort, Castoriadis, Guy Debord, respectively. The essays in Part III turn
to new developments in radical democratic thought. Rachel Magnusson’s
contribution on the idea of the equality of the intelligences in Jacques Rancière’s
thought is a clear explanation of a concept that is difficult to defend. James D.
Ingram’s piece on Étienne Balibar is a typically strong example of his critical
studies of various aspects of radical democracy. Lastly, Breaugh’s account of
Abensour’s thought is nuanced, attentive and subtle theoretical explication.
What are we to make of these various critiques? As a series of surveys into
discrete theories of radical democracy, this collected volume excels. The ideas of
each thinker are defined and explained. They are, however, strikingly siloed
accounts and there is rarely any attempt at general critique, let alone criticism. To
be fair, at times this is expressly the purpose of the collected edition, which the
editors write is ‘‘not to engage with specific contributions… Rather, the
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chapters introduce to readers a political tradition of thought’’ (p. 7). But this
assertion is quickly swept aside by the editors, who juxtapose radical democratic
theory against liberal and deliberative democratic theory. Each essayist does the
same, and throughout the book we are reminded, again and again, that what we are
reading is not ‘‘theory’’ or ‘‘philosophy,’’ but rather ‘‘interventions’’ and
‘‘provocations.’’ Here we arrive as a recurrent problem with radical democratic
theory. For these provocations are rarely subject – either by the editors or by the
authors – to the same level of reflexivity and critical engagement that radical
democratic theory otherwise celebrates. One exception to this is Ingram’s
chapter on Balibar, who exactly because of his nuanced critiques of Marxism
and liberalism, comes to criticize radical democracy: ‘‘by reducing politics to this
hyperbolic demand, it loses sight of the fact that this demand needs to be
institutionalized if rights are to have any social and political reality’’ (p. 220).
The editorial introduction facilitates the avoidance of criticism by framing
radical democratic theory against strawman accounts of liberalism and deliberative
democratic theories. The ur-strawmen of radical democratic theory are John Rawls
and Jürgen Habermas. Rawls is described by the editors as defending an
‘‘ideologically pure theory grounded in absolutely valid or axiomatic truths of
human behaviour and organization’’ (p. 15), and liberalism is cast as an institutional
arrangement intended only to temper democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists
are described as concerned with devising institutional arrangements for the
manifestation of ‘‘a potential universal political will insofar as people are seen as
capable of moving towards agreement founded on mutual understanding.’’ This is
then described as entailing that ‘‘each person’s original uniqueness is gradually
stamped out through a fixation on deliberative interactions aiming at universality’’
(pp. 6–7). Consequently, what Habermas and the deliberative democratic traditions
necessarily end up reproducing, we are told, is the ‘‘liberal idea of perfect human
rationality’’ (p. 5). In what world is Rawlsian liberalism based on uncovering an
‘‘ideologically pure’’ theory and deliberative democracy aiming to stamp out
individuality? In one sense, this is not a criticism of the editors, as they’ve done a
fine job in summarizing the tenor of much of the radical democratic theory
surveyed in this collected volume.
Strawman arguments are problematic, but the more important problem is that
accepting those strawman arguments forecloses a whole series of important
questions. A serious engagement with Rawls – or at least with the core problem that
Rawls addresses – could have been a good place to start. This is because Rawls
begins with a basic question: how do we go about living together? Either normative
political philosophy is minimally addressable to the ‘‘political, social, and
economic institutions’’ (Rawls 1985, p. 224) of our world, or it is not. If it is
not, fine, but that position must be defended instead of elided. If it is addressable,
then the rudiments of Rawls’s project must be honestly addressed. Rawls wants to
uncover a political conception of justice: ‘‘such a conception must allow for a
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diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable,
conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic societies’’
(Rawls, p. 225). It is a question of solidarity and the stakes are high: ‘‘The only
alternative to a principle of toleration…’’ Rawls concludes, ‘‘is the autocratic use of
state power’’ (Rawls, p. 230). Presumably, the task of radical democratic theory is
twofold: to express what radical democracy is or could be, and then to defend that
claim. As the collected essays in this volume all attest, the former has been done
with significant philosophical refinement. The essays under review are generally
reticent regarding the latter.
The closest we get to a response to Rawls’s basic concerns are passages found in
Abensour’s article on Clastres, Hobbes, and war. Abensour flirts with Clastres’s
account of the domination-destroying role of war in primitive societies as
potentially contributing to conceptions of radical democracy. The foundation of
this discussion is the striking continuity between what the editors called radical
democracy’s ‘‘particular preoccupation with indeterminacy, difference, or divi-
sion’’ (p. 4) and Clastres’s observation that ‘‘War by its very texture implements or
develops a unique form of sociability – a social being that operates through the
dispersion, partition, fragmentation, the reign of the multiple – which is directly
antithetical to the form of sociality that institutes the state’’ (p. 111). While
scandalous implications are clear, they are avoided by Abensour’s assumption of
the role of provocateur: ‘‘We are still far from praising war. It is, rather, about
casting a legitimate suspicion on the very idea of peace’’ (p. 115). It is therefore
curious, to say the least, that Abensour concludes by praising, by way of Rousseau,
the (paraphrased) ‘‘cruel wars, flowing blood, murders, banishments, and civil
wars’’ (p. 115) that did so much to augment good republican (not democratic)
virtues and, ultimately, state power. It is likewise perplexing that it goes without
comment that Machiavelli, whom Abensour also cites, advised (not as provocation,
but as policy) in his Discourses on Livy using these tumults instrumentally in the
service of colonial expansion and, again, to institute the state (p. 115). One can
begin to see the virtues of not having to respond to Rawls.
The lack of critical evaluation of radical democracy does a disservice to the task
of critique. Consider Holman’s strong account of Arendt. Holman treads well-
known ground regarding the importance of council democracy in Arendt. Towards
the conclusion, Holman quotes Arendt’s claim that ‘‘The councils say: We want to
participate, we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and we
want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country.’’ (p. 232)
Holman’s task is to prove Arendt’s radical democratic chops, and this quotation
clearly falls in line with radical democratic focus on indeterminacy and action.
However, the quotation stops at exactly the point where Arendt considers what this
would look like, and it is there that a whole series of real theoretical concerns arise.
Arendt continues:
Review Essay
S48  2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 17, S1, S43–S50
Since the country is too big for all of us to come together and determine our
fate, we need a number of public spaces within it. The booth in which we
deposit our ballots is unquestionably too small, for this booth has room for
only one. The parties are completely unsuitable; there we are, most of us,
nothing but the manipulated electorate. But if only ten of us are sitting around
a table, each expressing his opinion, each hearing the opinions of others, then
a rational formation of opinion can take place through the exchange of
opinions. There, too, it will become clear which one of us is best suited to
present our view before the next higher council, where in turn our view will
be clarified through the influence of other views, revised, or proved wrong
(Arendt 1972, pp. 232–233).
This is Arendt’s substantive exposition of the council system in action: it involves
deliberation, the creation of a miniature rational overlapping consensus, and
institutionalization. It is a privileged field of actions for the few who Arendt calls
the ‘‘true political elite in a country’’ (only episodically the workers, not the poor,
the foreigner, those affected, or the far-off), and it is necessarily hierarchical. If this
is radical democracy, then for Arendt radical democracy is a highly elitist practice
entailing something like the rationality-discovering procedures and institutions that
the editors rejected out of hand in the introduction.
Consider also Magnusson’s discussion of Rancière’s anti-expertise ‘‘equality of
intelligences’’ claim, and its relationship to the radical democratic criticism of
institutions. Again, it is an excellent contribution, strengthened by its validation of
Rancière’s claim and repudiation of radical democracy theorists who have tried to
temper the claim or distance themselves from it. That is the right approach to
explicating the idea, and we learn more about radical democratic theory because of
it. As Magnusson shows, for Rancière this was ‘‘a literal presupposition’’ (p. 205).
Magnusson proves her point, but unfortunately recedes to – or perhaps uncritically
accepts – Rancière ‘‘provocation’’ disposition. Why not address the provocations?
One could ask, for example, if expertise is really anti-democratic? Arendt didn’t
think so; the esotericism of the radical democracy literature is an immanent
disavowal of this claim. But consider a mundane example (examples, by the way,
are few and far between). I’m writing from The Netherlands, which exists in large
part because of robust institution of dykes and levees. This system is complicated,
needs to account for local variation, and requires a large institutional apparatus to
keep it functioning over time. It is also supported by a remarkably long history of
representative democracy. The system must address, today, problems of ocean
levels that will rise long after our time, which it does with some success. What
would a radical democrat say (substantively) about this ‘‘oligarchic’’ ‘‘police
order’’ (to use Rancière’s terminology) of dykes and levees which is planned and
controlled by experts at the direction of local representatives? The answer to this
question is not at all clear. However, there are good reasons to hold that it would be
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radically anti-democratic to open this system to aleatory ‘‘acts’’ of politics, whether
based on suppositions of equal intelligence or not.
This is not a limited example. There is an anti-institutional critique that pervades
these chapters, an escapism supported by a rarely persuasive world or French
philosophy. Are the health care systems which guard people from physical and
economic destitution, the sanctuary cities which protect illegal immigrants from
arbitrary state powers, and the labor organizations which lend their weight to
defending workers ‘‘police’’? Is the ACLU? Are garbage removal services, and the
multiplicity of urban institutions that constitute the nuts and bolts of quotidian non-
domination part of the ‘‘police’’? One assumes that radical democrats would
somehow support these sorts of politics and these institutions, and there are some
gestures in that regard. The closest we get is in Breaugh’s essay on Abensour,
where he remarks that ‘‘For Abensour, insurgent democracy is selective in its
choice of institutions, and its basic criteria for accepting an institution is that of
non-domination. As long as an institutional framework allows for the promotion of
non-domination, it is potentially compatible with insurgent democracy’’ (p. 244).
Potentially, that’s the rub: not only is radical democratic theory roundly unwilling
to take up the difficult questions of institution building, radical democratic thought
privileges radical political action to such an extent that it is willing to undermine
domination-minimizing institutional arrangements. As with many authors in this
volume, Breaugh does a quite admirable job in explicating the underlying
philosophy that informs radical democratic ideas. Nevertheless, the original
concerns remain, and one does look forward to the day when radical democratic
philosophy will come down from the clouds.
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